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Abstract 
People’s preferences for a particular outcome can influence how they perceive the likelihood of 
that outcome over other outcomes. For example, a football fan who strongly desires his team to 
win an upcoming game may be overly optimistic in the likelihood that his team will, in fact, win 
the upcoming game. This phenomenon is referred to as wishful thinking or the desirability bias. 
Previous research has examined many factors that could potentially decrease wishful thinking 
(e.g., incentives for accuracy, enhanced instructions to be unbiased). Surprising to some, most of 
the previous attempts to decrease wishful thinking have been unsuccessful. For example, even 
when give a relatively large incentive to make an accurate prediction, their desires still 
influenced their predictions. The current study expands previous literature by examining how 
additional and accurate information might influences wishful thinking. We predicted that 
providing participants with additional accurate information would decrease the amount of 
wishful thinking they demonstrate in predicting the outcome of the United States 2016 
Presidential Election. Among other questions, participants were asked to indicate which 
candidate they preferred to win the election. Then, participants were either given no additional 
information, accurate and current polling information, or election expert opinions. Participants 
then predicted who they thought would win the election. Inconsistent with my hypothesis, the 
study found that providing additional information did not decrease wishful thinking. This study 
is consistent with other failed attempts to decrease wishful thinking and highlights how 
influential people’s preferences can be to the judgments they make.  
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Attempts to Debias Wishful Thinking in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election 
When thinking about the future, it is common that people will desire one outcome over 
another. People’s preferences for an outcome can influence their perceptions of the likelihood of 
that outcome over others (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007). For example, a football fan’s desire to see 
his or her team win an upcoming game might influence this fan’s prediction as to whether the 
team will, in fact, win the game. Previous research confirmed that people are likely to 
overestimate the likelihood of an event that has a personally desired outcome—that is, people 
often exhibit wishful thinking (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007). While people have been shown to 
demonstrate wishful thinking in a wide variety of contexts, relatively few studies have examined 
factors that might help mitigate the influence of people’s preferences on their expectations. The 
current project examined the influence of candidate preference on people’s outcome predictions 
of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Importantly, I examined if providing participants with 
additional information about the possible outcomes could impact the amount of wishful thinking 
they exhibited when predicting the outcome of the election.    
As noted above, wishful thinking—also referred to as the desirability bias—occurs when 
people’s desires influence their predictions of unknown outcomes (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007). 
Before describing the background research on wishful thinking, it is important to note that 
wishful thinking is not simply being over-optimistic about the future. There are a number of 
factors that can cause a person to be overly optimistic, even in the absence of personal 
preferences (Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, & Keeney, 1981). For example, people may 
believe they are less likely to suffer from a certain disease due to a lack of knowledge regarding 
the factors that make one susceptible to developing the disease. Rather than having a preference 
for one outcome over another, a person’s inadequate information about the development of the 
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disease could cause his or her heightened sense of optimism. Another example of optimism that 
is not necessarily caused by a preference for a particular outcome could be the behavior/beliefs 
of gamblers in games of roulette. The gambler may be overoptimistic that the marble will land in 
the desired position due to a misconception or error of the gambler, rather than a personal 
preference (Jarvik, 1951). In other words, there are many reasons as to why someone might be 
overly optimistic about the future with people’s preferences only being one of those reasons.  
Much of the previous research on wishful thinking has used the marked card paradigm to 
examine the bias. Marks (1951) developed the marked card paradigm to examine how 
desirability and objective probability influenced children’s perceived likelihood of pulling a 
picture card from a stack of blank cards. Importantly, to manipulate desirability, on some of the 
rounds the children would gain points if the card pulled happened to be a picture card. On other 
rounds, the children would lose points if they pulled a picture card. Before pulling a card, the 
children were asked to predict whether they would pull a picture card or not. Participants were 
more likely to predict a picture card when the card was associated with winning points. In other 
words, children’s expectations for pulling a picture card were higher when they wanted to pull a 
picture card. Furthermore, as the probability of pulling a picture card increased, expectations of 
doing so increased in both the desirable and undesirable conditions. Taken together, this shows 
that children are sensitive to objective probabilities but are also influenced by their preferences 
for one outcome over another.  
Whereas children have been shown to exhibit wishful thinking (Marks, 1951), adults are 
not immune to being biased by their preferences. Windschitl, Smith, Rose, and Krizan (2010) 
used an updated version of the marked card paradigm to examine wishful thinking in young 
adults. In an attempt to reduce the likelihood of demand characteristics and experimenter bias, 
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the researchers changed the task so that the experimenters were unaware of the benefit of pulling 
a marked card. Earlier marked-card paradigms had allowed for the experimenter to be aware of 
the benefit and could have possibly influenced the way in which participants responded. 
Although these changes were made, the adults still demonstrated heavy wishful thinking in their 
predictions.  
Whereas wishful thinking consistently biases outcome predictions (e.g., will the card be 
marked or not), it exerts substantially weaker effects on likelihood judgements (e.g., on a 0-
100% scale, how likely is it that the card will be marked; Windschitl et al., 2010). For example, 
imagine that participants are presented with four blue cards and six red cards and are then told 
that pulling a blue card results in gaining $5. When asked to make a likelihood judgement, it is 
common for the participants to report a 40% chance of pulling a blue card; however, when asked 
to make an outcome prediction, participants are likely to predict pulling a blue card, disregarding 
the lower likelihood of doing so. 
After running five studies using variations of the marked-card paradigm, Windschitl et al. 
(2010) argued that a biased-guessing account is responsible for wishful thinking. The biased-
guessing account suggests that wishful thinking demonstrated in marked-card paradigms stems 
from the amount of uncertainty in the judgment being made. When making a likelihood 
judgment, there may be an objectively correct response. For example, if 4 of the 10 cards are 
blue, there is a 40% chance a blue card will be pulled. While the outcome is uncertain, the is no 
uncertainty in the judgment that is being made. On the other hand, when making an outcome 
prediction, the “correct” response is more arbitrary. Windschitl et al. found that the more 
arbitrary the situation, the more likely people will guess optimistically. Predicting a situation 
such as a marked-card paradigm requires a sense of guessing, and when people think that part of 
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their prediction is somewhat of a guess, wishful thinking was the strongest; however, making 
likelihood judgements tends to be less arbitrary. Therefore, when participants are asked to do so, 
wishful thinking was nearly absent.  
In addition to utilizing variations of the marked-card paradigm, other researchers have 
examined wishful thinking in situations involving real-world predictions (e.g., Babad & Katz, 
1991; Krizan, Miller, & Johar, 2008; Massey, Simmons, & Armor, 2011). For example, Krizan 
et al. (2008) examined young voter’s preferences and expectations of the 2008 U.S. Presidential 
Election. They did so at four different times throughout the month before the election. The 
researchers examined the relationship between participants’ preferences for a candidate to win 
and their predictions about which candidate would indeed win. As expected, participants tended 
to predict their preferred candidate as the winner of the election. This relationship became even 
stronger closer to the election date. They also found that the participants’ political party 
identification influenced the levels of wishful thinking in predicting the outcome of the election; 
the stronger participants identified with their party, the more wishful thinking they demonstrated. 
It is interesting to note that even when participants were asked about current polls and media 
coverage of each candidate, they still exhibited wishful thinking for their preferred political 
party.  
Wishful thinking has been shown to be prevalent in both lab-based and real-world 
contexts, and some recent research has begun examining possible ways to reduce wishful 
thinking Multiple studies have examined different factors and their influence on wishful 
thinking. For example, gathering football predictions from National Football League fans, 
Massey et al. (2011) examined the influence that familiarity and experience had on wishful 
thinking. Preferences were determined by the participant’s favorite team, and familiarity was 
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measured by the participants reported preseason knowledge of the team. Participants were asked 
to make predictions throughout the season rather than predicting only one game. Because 
participants made predictions throughout the season, they gained more knowledge about the 
team’s performance as the season progressed. Therefore, they could have used this knowledge to 
overcome wishful thinking when making predictions later in the season. Although predictions 
did get slightly better throughout the season, participants’ preferences continued to influence 
their predictions about the outcomes of the games. This study shows that even with information 
about past experience, people were still more likely to predict their favorite team as the winner, 
even when the odds were not necessarily in their favor.  
To determine if personal financial threat would influence wishful thinking, Babad and 
Katz (1991) examined wishful thinking in Israeli soccer fans and bettors. To do so, the 
researchers asked participants to predict game outcomes while in a soccer stadium watching a 
game, on a questionnaire while at a betting pole, as well as on actual betting forms in which the 
participants had invested their own money. Because people pay to bet, one would imagine that 
predictions would be more rational rather than optimistic. The researchers found that participants 
still predicted their favorite team to win, even when it was clearly a threat to their financial 
investment. This was true when participants were asked in each of the three environments, 
regardless of if their own money had been invested. It appears that people seem to be unaffected 
by additional information, incentives, and familiarity when making predictions about desired 
outcomes.  
One may assume when people are presented with larger incentives for accurate 
predictions that wishful thinking would decrease. In order to test this assumption, Simmons and 
Massey (2012) had football fans make predictions about upcoming games that either did or did 
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not involve their favorite team. The researchers manipulated the incentives for making accurate 
predictions. Specifically, some participants were told they would get $5 for a correct prediction 
while other participants were told they would get $50 for a correct prediction. It was possible 
that when $50 was on the line, the participants would carefully evaluate the teams in the game 
and provide an unbiased prediction of the likely winner. Contrary to this possibility, regardless of 
incentives ($5 versus $50), approximately the same percentage of people predicted their favorite 
football teams to win. This study demonstrated that incentives for accuracy do not decrease 
wishful thinking and that most people have a lot of confidence in their biased predictions. This 
can be troublesome if people cannot set their desires and preferences aside to make accurate 
decisions and predictions in everyday life.  
As discussed above, many previous studies have found that numerous factors have failed 
to reduce the amount of wishful thinking people demonstrate when making predictions of 
outcomes. The present research extends this by examining whether providing additional and 
accurate information influences the strength of wishful thinking in predicting the outcome of the 
2016 Presidential Election. In this study, participants were asked to indicate who they preferred 
to win the election and then to make a prediction as to who they thought would win the election. 
Before making their prediction, each participant was randomly assigned to either receive no 
additional information, current and accurate national polling information, or five predictions 
from political experts. I hypothesized that participants who received additional polling 
information or election expert opinions would demonstrate less wishful thinking when predicting 
the outcome of the election than those receiving no additional information. While most previous 
studies attempting to reduce wishful thinking have failed, the present study hoped that explicitly 
providing additional information to participants would result in lower demonstrations of wishful 




Two hundred ninety-nine participants (48.5% male, 51.5% female, Mage= 38.64, SDage= 
13.49) recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participated in the study. Participants 
were compensated $.50 for their participation.  
Procedure and Measures 
A day before the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, participants were recruited using 
MTurk. Participants were first presented with the informed consent document. After agreeing to 
participate, the participants saw a message explaining that the survey would cover politics and 
the 2016 United States Presidential Election. Next, participants responded to a number of 
questions, such as their level of interest in politics, whether they planned on voting in the 
upcoming election, and whether they voted in the previous election. Many of these served as 
filler items designed to disguise the purpose of the study. In order to measure participants’ 
preference for the outcome of the election, the participants were asked “Who do you want to win 
the upcoming U.S. Presidential Election?” The participants responded on a sliding scale ranging 
from “Want Clinton MUCH more than Trump” to “Want Trump MUCH more than Clinton”. 
The responses were coded on a 0-100 scale with lower score indicating a preference for Clinton 
and higher scores indicating a preference for Trump. They were then asked their age, highest 
level of education they completed, and gender.  
Next, participants were asked to respond to a 12-item Social and Economic Conservatism 
Scale (SECS; Everett, 2013). This scale presented politically relevant issues (abortion, limited 
government, military, religion, welfare, gun ownership, traditional marriage and values, fiscal 
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responsibility, business, family unit, and patriotism) with a sliding scale ranging from 0 (greater 
negativity towards each issue) to 100 (greater positivity towards each issue). This scale measures 
political ideology by assessing participants’ feelings on multiple social and economic issues 
related to conservatism.  
Each participant was then randomly assigned to either the control condition (receiving no 
additional information), current polling condition (CPC), or expert opinion condition (EOC). 
Those in the CPC were presented with current and accurate polling information regarding which 
candidate was projected to win (see Appendix A). Participants in the EOC were presented with 
five political expert opinions (see Appendix B). The experts chosen were real people, and a 
prediction was attributed to them based on their experience. Specifically, three of the five 
predictions projected Clinton as the winner in an attempt to roughly match the polling 
information. 
After the presentation of the information, the participants were asked to indicate which 
candidate (Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump) they thought would win the upcoming United 
States Presidential Election. Lastly, the participants were asked the degree of confidence they 
held for their selection, ranging from not at all confident to extremely confident. Finally, the 
participants read a debriefing statement and were paid for their participation. 
Results 
Relationships Among Variables 
Before testing my hypothesis, I first looked at the relationships among demographic 
variables (i.e., age, gender, and education), political beliefs, preference for the candidates, and 
the prediction of the winner of the election. A significant relationship between age and 
conservatism was revealed, showing that older participants tended to be more politically 
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conservative. Additionally, a significant relationship was found between conservatism and both 
preference and prediction. Those with more conservative views tended to prefer and predict 
Trump over Clinton. Finally, there was a strong positive relationship between participants’ 
preferences for who they want to win the election and their prediction as to who they thought 
would win the election (see Table 1). This suggests that, at least to some extent, people’s 
predictions were likely influenced by their preferences. In other words, participants exhibited 
wishful thinking. 
Test of Hypothesis 
For each participant, I examined whether their preferred candidate was the same 
candidate they predicted to win. To do this, I examined the number of participants who predicted 
their preferred candidate. For example, if a participant reported that he wanted Clinton to win the 
election (i.e., his preference score was less than 50) and he predicted that Clinton would win the 
election, he predicted his preferred candidate. Likewise, if a participant reported that she wanted 
Trump to win the election (i.e., her preference score was greater than 50) and she predicted that 
Trump would win the election, she predicted her preferred candidate. Two participants (less than 
1% of the sample) were dropped because they reported no preference as to who won the election 
(i.e., their preference score was exactly 50). Because wishful thinking is the tendency for 
preferences to shape expectations, participants with no preference for either candidate would not 
demonstrate wishful thinking. Overall, 77.4% of the participants predicted that their preferred 
candidate would win the election. As shown in Figure 1, 79.8% of participants in the current 
polling condition, 76.7% in the expert opinion condition, and 75.5% in the control condition 
predicted that the candidate they preferred to win would, in fact, win the election. These 
percentages show that participants demonstrated a general trend of wishful thinking in predicting 
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the outcome of the 2016 Presidential Election. In order to text my hypothesis, I conducted a 
Pearson Chi-Square Test on the percentages of participants who predicted their preferred 
candidate in each of the conditions. Contrary to my hypothesis, there was not a significant 
difference in the percentage of participants who predicted their preferred candidate across the 
three conditions, X2 (2, N = 297) = .598, p = .74. In other words, regardless of whether 
participants received accurate polling information, expert opinions, or no information, they 
demonstrated similar levels of wishful thinking in their predictions of the election.  
Next, I conducted separate analyses on people who preferred Clinton to win the election 
and people who preferred Trump to win the election. Again, a score on the preference scale over 
50 was classified as preferring Trump and a score below 50 indicated a preference for Clinton. 
Virtually all participants in support of Clinton predicted her to win the election (98.4% in the 
current polling condition, 94.3% in the expert opinion condition, and 95.5% in the control 
condition; see Figure 1). A Pearson Chi-Square Test was conducted examining the percentage of 
participants who preferred Clinton as the winner in each condition; this analysis revealed no 
significant difference across the three conditions, X2 (2, N = 184) = 1.46, p = .48. That is to say, 
the majority of participants that preferred Clinton to win also predicted her to win even when 
provided with additional information.  
Participants who preferred Trump and predicted him to win were lower (53.3% in the 
CPC, 48.5% in the EOC, and 37.1% in the CC). Although these percentages were slightly 
different between conditions, a separate Pearson Chi-Square Test was ran on the percentage of 
participants that preferred Trump in each condition that revealed the differences as statistically 
insignificant across the three conditions, X2 (2, N = 113) = 2.12, p = .35. Thus, regardless of 
whether the participants received additional information, there were no significant differences 
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between the three conditions when the participants wanted Trump to win.   
Taken together, these analyses show that people’s predictions were not influenced by 
receiving information prior to making their prediction. Furthermore, the lack of sensitivity to the 
information manipulation did not depend on whether participants had a preference for Clinton or 
Trump. 
Discussion 
Previous research has found that people commonly overestimate the likelihood of an 
outcome that is desirable (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007). Furthermore, most attempts to debias 
wishful thinking have remained unsuccessful (Massey et al., 2011; Babad & Katz, 1991; 
Simmons & Massey, 2012). This study examined the impact of providing accurate and additional 
information on the amount of wishful thinking people demonstrate when making predictions of 
unknown outcomes. I hypothesized that providing participants with current polling information 
or expert opinions would decrease the wishful thinking demonstrated when predicting the 
outcome of the 2016 Presidential Election. However, contrary to my hypothesis, providing 
participants with information did not decrease the amount of wishful thinking they demonstrated. 
That is, participants tended to predict their preferred candidate as the winner even when given 
additional information. For the Clinton supporters, this pattern is perhaps not surprising because 
the additional information stated that Clinton was likely to win the election. Therefore, the 
additional information likely bolstered their beliefs about the outcome of the election. For the 
Trump supporters, however, the additional information contradicted their preferences.   
There are a number of possible explanations as to why the additional information failed 
to decrease wishful thinking. The survey was conducted online, so there is the possibility that 
participants did not read carefully or pay attention while responding. The sensible patterns found 
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(i.e., older participants tended to be more politically conservative and more conservative 
participants tended to prefer and predict Trump over Clinton) suggest that participants were, in 
fact, paying attention and reading carefully. Furthermore, there were no differences between our 
conditions for the participants with a preference for Trump. This could be the result of a 
defensive response from participants. The information presented suggested that their preferred 
candidate was going to lose, so it is possible they became defensive and ignored the additional 
information. It is also possible that the participants were already aware of the information 
provided to them. If the participants already knew of the current polls, providing them with this 
information would not influence their predictions. Wishful thinking is a strong bias, and it is 
possible that the amount of information presented was not enough to have an impact on the 
predictions.  
One limitation of the study is that I simply examined the correlation between preferences 
and predictions. Wishful thinking occurs when preferences exert a causal influence on 
expectations of the outcomes (Krizan & Windschilt, 2007). With the current study design, it is 
impossible to know for sure whether preferences influenced expectations of outcomes or if 
expectations influenced preferences. While this is possible, Kizan et al. (2008) found no 
evidence for bandwagon effects when participants were asked to predict the 2008 U.S. 
Presidential Election. That is, participants did not seem to shift their preferences to match the 
candidate perceived most likely to win. 
This study provides multiple directions for future research. Rather than using self-report 
surveys, a future study could examine the influence of providing additional information in other 
contexts. If defensiveness in participants is contributing to the results, future studies could 
identify other ways in which to present people with information without causing defensive 
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responding. For example, when examining wishful thinking in an election, participants could be 
presented with information containing only polling data and no stated predictions. This would 
allow for participants to develop their own interpretation of the information. Providing 
participants with different types of additional information multiple times before asking for 
predictions may help ensure that some of the information is actually new. Rather than using only 
polling information, a study could expose participants to actual news reports and election debate 
coverages. Additionally, this information could be presented multiple times before asking 
participants to make a prediction. Although providing participants with incentives for accurate 
predictions has failed to decrease wishful thinking in earlier research, it is possible that future 
research could examine ways to provide incentives that effectively influence participants to make 
more accurate predictions.  
Conclusion 
It seems as though wishful thinking is a bias that is extremely difficult to reduce when 
making predictions of outcomes. Providing incentives, additional information, and personal 
investment have all failed to reduce the amount of wishful thinking people demonstrate in 
outcome predictions. The results of this study can be troublesome in every-day life. The idea that 
providing people with more information leads to more accurate decisions and predictions is 
challenged by these results. Our criminal justice system presses the jury with as much available 
information as possible in hopes for the correct verdict to be chosen. If providing people with 
additional information does not reduce their bias in predictions, many common systems relying 
on this idea becomes faulty. These results show the importance of future research on additional 
information and wishful thinking. It is important that people make the most accurate and 
informed decision in many circumstances, and biases in decision making can result in negative 
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consequences.  
  
DEBIAS WISHFUL THINKING  17 
References 
Babad, E., & Katz, Y. (1991). Wishful thinking - against all odds. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 21, 1921-1938. 
Fischhoff, B., Lichtenstein, S., Slovic, P., Derby, S. L., & Keeney, R. L. (1981). Acceptable risk. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Jarvik, M. E. (1951). Probability learning and a negative recency effect in the serial anticipation 
of symbols. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41, 291–297. 
Krizan, Z., Miller, J. C., & Johar, O. (2010). Wishful thinking in the 2008 U.S. presidential 
election. Psychological Science, 21(1). 140-146. 
Krizan, Z., & Windschitl, P. D. (2007). The influence of outcome desirability on 
optimism. Psychological Bulletin, 133(1), 95-121. 
Marks, R. W. (1951). The effect of probability, desirability, and ‘privilege’ on the stated 
expectations of children. Journal of Personality, 19(3), 332-351. doi:10.1111/1467-
6494.ep8930182 
Massey, C., Simmons, J., & Armor, D. (2011). Hope over experience: Desirability and the 
persistence of optimism. Psychological Science, 22(2), 274-281. 
Simmons, J. P., & Massey, C. (2012). Is optimism real? Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 141(4), 630-634. 
Windschitl, P. D., Smith, A. R., Rose, J. P., & Krizan, Z. (2010). The desirability bias in 
predictions: Going optimistic without leaving realism. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 111, 33-47. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2009.08.003  
DEBIAS WISHFUL THINKING  18 
Appendix A 
A nonpartisan company (FiveThirtyEight.com) collects and combines multiple nationally 
representative polls. Based on the combination of numerous polls, as of November 6th they have 
projected that Donald Trump will receive 45.6% of the popular vote and Hillary Clinton is 
projected to receive 48.3% of the popular vote. Therefore, based on the nationally representative 
polling data, Hillary Clinton is projected to win the presidential election. 
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Appendix B 
Danny Hayes is an Associate Professor of Political Science at George Washington University. 
He has expertise in American politics and public opinion. He has predicted that Hillary Clinton 
will win the upcoming election. 
Bob Shrum, a Political Consultant and Strategist for John Kerry and Al Gore who has produced 
advertising for 26 U.S. Senate campaigns, predicts that Hillary Clinton will win the upcoming 
election.  
David Plouffe, a Political Strategist and campaign manager for Barrack Obama's 2008 election, 
has predicted that Hillary Clinton will win the upcoming election.  
Stuart Stevens, a previous top Political Strategist for Mitt Romney, has predicted that Donald 
Trump will win the upcoming election.  
Lynn Vavreck is a Professor of Political Science and Communication Studies at University of 
California in Los Angeles. She has expertise in campaigns, elections, voter behavior, and public 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and relationships among participant characteristics. 
 Mean (SD) Education Gender Conservatism Preference Prediction 





- -.10 -.01 -.02 -.07 
Gender Male: 48.5% Female: 51.5%  - .05 -.02 .01 
Conservatism 57.84 (19.36)   - .60*** -.38*** 
Preference  61.5% Clinton 38.5% Trump    - .59*** 
Prediction 79.6% Clinton 20.4% Trump     - 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; Conservatism scores range from 0-100 with higher 
values indicating more conservative political beliefs. For both the Preference and Prediction 
variables, high numbers indicate preference/prediction for Trump. HS/SC = High school or some 
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